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USE OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT BY AN ATTORNEY AS GRouIm-s FOR
DISBARMENT
Introduction
A principle considered basic to man's human rights was em-
bodied by the framers in the Federal Constitution and is contained
in the Fifth Amendment.' This principle: the privilege against
self-incrimination. Widespread attention has been directed to its
invocation in recent years in grand jury investigations. 2 Further
attention has been attracted by the frequent use of the privilege
in congressional inquiries into espionage and membership in the
communist party and affiliated organizations.
While the privilege has been in existence for several centuries,
dating back to Lilburn's case 3 in the Star Chamber of England,
many problems have evolved in determining the situations in
which it can be legally invoked. Currently, the focus of the nation-
al spotlight has beamed on so-called "Fifth Amendment Lawyers,"
referring to attorneys who employ the constitutional privilege.
This heated controversy involves the question of whether an at-
torney who refuses to answer questions as to past or present mem-
bership in the communist party or other subversive organizations
on the basis of the Fifth Amendment should be disbarred. Two
opposite positions have become firmly established. There are, on
one side, those who believe that such an attorney should be sum-
marily disbarred. On the other side, there is a group which con-
tends that no conclusive presumption should result from a state-
ment by a lawyer that to answer might incriminate him. Funda-
mentally, the problem is concerned with a distinction between a
person as an individual and a person as an attorney. Litigation on
this precise subject is limited to a case recently decided in Flor-
ida.4 The purpose of this discussion is to consider both positions
and to propose the possible solutions.
The Status of a Lawyer
The practice of law is a profession which has been honored for
1 U.S. CoNST. amend. V. It provides that "No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... .
2 Note, 30 NOTRE DAmz LAw. 284 (1955).
* 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
* Sheiner v. Florida, 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
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many years as one of the noblest vocations of human endeavor.
Its earliest beginning dates back to the Greek and Roman civiliza-
tions. Traditionally, the number of persons who are admitted to
the legal practice has been limited to those persons mentally and
morally qualified. The practice of law is not available to anyone
who wishes to engage in it,5 nor is it a natural right or one guar-
anteed by the Constitution. The admission to the bar of any par-
ticular state is not a privilege or an immunity within the constitu-
tional meaning of those terms. 6 It can be appropriately stated that:
Practice of the law is an impersonal name applied to the mechanics
of administering justice through the medium of judges and lawyers.
The administration of justice is a service rendered by the State to
the public and exacts of those who engage in it the highest degree
of confidence and good faith.7
Actually, the practice of law can be likened to a privilege or a
franchise granted by the state to those persons possessing high
moral characteristics. The state has the interest of all its citizens
at heart when it considers the admission of a person to its bar. The
service performed by every attorney vitally affects the public.
The. cQnduqt of all lawyers is controlled by the courts of the states
and nation. Hence, the role of courts and judges is marked by a
high degree of responsibility. From time immemorial, the ba.ck-
bone of civilization has been the legal profession, constantly keep-
ing the warring interests of society at bay.
Throughout the years, the attorney's upright character, includ-
ing fidelity to country and integrity in dealing with clients," has
established a trust and confidence vitally necessary to any democ-
racy.9 The contribution, of a lawyer to the politics of a nation is
correspondingly great.Y0 Advice must be given to people concern-
ing all the complexities and frailties of human nature. By such an
intimate relationship, resembling that of the doctor or the clergy-
man, an attorney exerts an influence over the minds of his clients
and the public-which is immeasurable in material values. Thus,
his political philosophy should conform to the Constitution which
he has sworn to uphold.
- . The Case for Disbarment
Adherents of the position that abrupt disbarment of an attorney
should result from his refusal to answer lawfully posed questions
concerning espionage or membership in the communist party on
5 Henington v. State Bd. of Bdr Examiners, 291 P2d 1108, 1110 (N..I.
1956).
6 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
7 - Lambdin v." State, 150 Fla. 814; 9 So. 2d 192, 193 (1942),-
8 Schware v. Bb&.rd of 'Bar Examiners, 291 P.2d 607, 60910 (N.M. 1955).
9 In re Casey, 359 Ill. 496, 195 N.E. 39, 41 (1935). :. -%':- :*.--.
10 Telegram from Paul Butler, National Chairman -of the .Democratic
Party, to the Notre Dame Politics Institute, February 21, .1956. . --
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the basis of the Fifth Amendment rely strongly on the oath which
each attorney takes upon his admission to the bar.'1 Any taint of a
political philosophy contrary to the Constitution demands an ex-
planation. Maintaining this position is the American Bar Associa-
tion.
Too much stress cannot be placed on the responsibility of the
position of the attorney in relation to the public. His struggle for
admission to the bar is long and arduous. It is only after satisfying
the court that his moral character and fitness are beyond reproach
that he will be certified as capable to practice law and worthy of
the trust and confidence placed in him by the public. Mr. Justice
Cardozo has stated that:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
A fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance
with that condition is essential at the moment of admission; but
it is equally essential afterwards.... Whenever the condition is
broken the privilege is lost.'
3
Disbarment is not punishment for a crime 14 nor is it a criminal
proceeding.' 5 It is merely a further test of character fitness, and
if it is found that the attorney is lacking the necessary qualifica-
tions to act properly as an officer of the court and to serve the
public, it is the duty of the court to remove him from the roll
of attorneys.
The communist party in the United States is no longer com-
patible with loyal citizenship. It advocates the overthrow of our
constitutional government by force.'6 As was stated in Martin v.
Law Society of British Columbia,'7 ". . . the Marxist philosophy
of law and government, in its essence, is so inimical in theory and
practice to our constitutional system and free society, that a person
professing them is eo ipso, not a fit and proper person to practice
1 E.g., SUPREME CouRT OF OHIo RuLEs OF PRACTICE XIV, § 15 (1952),
which states ".... I will support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Ohio.. . "
32 39 A.B.A.J. 1084 (1953). This position was re-affirmed in the report of
the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Communistic Tactics,
Strategy and Objectives, February, 1956.
13 In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S.
661 (1918).
'4 Ibid. See also Note, 30 Norm DAmz LAw. 273, 283 (1955).
15 Matter of Randall, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 473, 480 (1865).
16 In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950),
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in part and concurring in part, said at 424:
". .. Congress could rationally conclude that, behind its political party
facade, the Communist Party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary junta,
organized to reach ends and to use methods which are incompatible with
our constitutional system"
'7 3 DL.R. 173 (1950).
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law ..... "s On the basis of good citizenship alone, it would seem
that a lawyer should realize that he must speak truthfully and
openly. The responsibility and importance of his profession, borne
out by Shakespeare's comment in Henry VI, "the first thing we
do, let's kill all the lawyers,"' 9 should provide sufficient incentive.
The freedom of coming generations depends on it.
Logical reasoning seems to dictate that if admission to the bar is
denied because of a refusal to answer questions concerning com-
munistic affiliations, disbarment should also result. While pointing
out the importance of knowing where everyone stands in his politi-
cal beliefs, the court in the case of In re Anastaplo2° also empha-
sized the incompatibility of membership in the communist party
with the oath to support the federal and state constitutions. The
contention of an abridgment to the right of free speech was dis-
missed when the court said that by seeking the privilege of admis-
sion to the bar, the petitioner waived his constitutional right to
free speech. A conscientious objector has been dealt with in a sim-
ilar fashion.
2 '
A close analogy can be drawn between disbarment of attorneys
and the dismissal of school teachers for refusing, on the ground of
the Fifth Amendment, to answer questions pertaining to subver-
sive activities. Statutory provisions in California prohibit the ad-
vocacy or teaching of communistic principles to pupils for the pur-
pose of undermining their belief in the government of the United
States.22 Corresponding to the position of an attorney, a teacher is
licensed by the state after meeting special qualifications of char-
acter and mental fitness. While not referring to the legal profes-
sion, the court in Board of Education v. Wilkinson23 stated:
A teacher's employment in the public schools is a privilege, not a
right. A condition implicit in that privilege is loyalty to the govern-
ment under which the school system functions. It is the duty of
every teacher to answer proper questions in relation to his fitness
to teach our youth when put to him by a lawfully constituted body
authorized to propound such questions.
2 4
The reasons for demanding that a teacher should answer are
strikingly similar to those proposed by the advocates of disbar-
ment of attorneys. A teacher is placed in an even more advanta-
18 Id. at 176.
19 Henry VI, Part II, Act iv, sc. 2, 1. 86.
20 3 I1. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1955).
21 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
22 CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8275 (Deering 1952).
23 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P.2d 82 (1954). See also Daniman v. Board
of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
24 270 P.2d at 85.
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geous position for spreading the communist doctrine than an at-
torney. Impressionable young minds can very easily be swayed by
the peculiar opportunity presented.29 The legal profession and its
numbers thrive on the confidence which is placed in them by the
public. A similar condition exists with respect to the school system
and teachers.
26
Similar consideration can be accorded to municipal employees.
A statement of Mr. Justice Holmes is appropriate. In McAuliffe v.
City of New Bedford, 27 where the petitioner had been removed
from his position as a policeman because he actively indulged in
politics, Justice Holmes said: "the petitioner may have a consti-
tutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman. '28 The privilege against self-incrimination as ap-
plied to policemen requires that a distinction be made between
policemen as such and as individuals. A voluntary choice is avail-
able. Under the provisions of the privilege, a refusal to answer
questions is allowed. However, the exercise of the privilege can-
not be justified in light of the duty of a policeman.
2 9
The relation of the attorney to the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is comparable to that of the teacher and the policeman.
Besides being a citizen, an attorney is an officer of the court. His
responsibility in that position demands that privilege must bow to
duty. The oath to support the Constitution places a burden on the
attorney borne by no other profession or occupation.
The case of Sheiner v. Florida"° has received considerable atten-
tion as the first case squarely deciding the question of disbarment.
The effect of this decision may not be as strong when one consid-
ers the court's statement, "the real controversy here is whether or
not due process was accorded appellant in taking from him the
privilege to practice law."3 1 The emphasis on due process seems
to reduce the force which the decision might otherwise command.
The true effect of the decision remains to be observed.
The Case Against Disbarment
Conversely, there exists a segment of the legal profession -
both among practicing lawyers and students of the law - which
2 Faxon v. School Comm. of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E2d 772, 774
(1954).
26 Ibid. "The school committee could find that... if the petitioner were
allowed to continue teaching . .. that this would undermine public con-
fidence and react unfavorably upon the school system."
27 155 Mass. 216, 29 NE. 517 (1892).
28 Id. at 517.
29 Christal v. Police Comm. of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92
P.2d 416, 419 (1939).
30 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
31 Id. at 660.
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vehemently opposes the conclusion that invocation of the Fifth
Amendment by an attorney should result in immediate -disbar-
ment. To them, it would seem that adherents of the summary dis-
barment position altogether fail to understand the true status of an
attorney. While the practice of law is admittedly a privilege and
it burdens the lawyer with a serious responsibility for trustworthi-
ness, gaining this privilege is the culmination of years of arduous
work. It does not appear reasonable that a man's career and liveli-
hood should be destroyed without an adequate hearing. Preven-
tion of arbitrary action by the state is the primary purpose of the
guaranty of due process.
32
A realization of the scope of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is indispensable for a
correct interpretation of its application. The privilege protects the
attorney from exposures of direct criminality and exposures which
may provide an indirect possibility of incrimination3 3 It is within
the discretion of the judge whether or not the witness may refuse
to answer.34 In summary, it protects the innocent and shelters the
guilty.3 5 When the privilege is employed, however, solely for the
purpose of hindering or impeding the questioning and the fair ad-
ministration of justice, its use will not be allowed.,3
In the case of Sheiner v. Florida,3 7 serious stress was placed on
the amount of evidence adduced in the lower court which had pro-
nounced the disbarment. While conceding the fact that a lawyer
schooled in the teachings of American democracy could not be-
come a member of the communist party without forfeiting his priv-
ilege to practice law, the court reasoned that:
To deprive one of the privilege to practice law should never be
done by "faceless informers,". . . . Depriving one of the right to
practice law is the superlative stain that may be stamped on his
character and when a square issue on that point is made by the
pleadings, the state should come forward with proof adequate to
support the charge.38
Whenever a witness refuses to answer a question, an inference
is raised. But if the privilege against self-incrimination protects
the innocent as well as the guilty, the invocation of the privilege
does not provide the basis for any inference of criminal conduct.39
32 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US. 78, 101 (1908).
3 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (D.Va. 1807). If the
answer might form a link in a chain of testimony, the witness may refuse
to answer.
3e1 Id. at 40.
35 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
36 In re Levy, 255 N.Y. 223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931).
37 82 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
38 Id. at 661.




Therefore, reason dictates that such a valuable privilege should
be incapable of being withdrawn .on the basis of inference alone.
When the force behind the constitutional privilege is recog-
nized, it seems that the exercise of the privilege stands above the
duties of any profession. Immunity statutes have provided a large
amount of the litigation concerning the Fifth Amendment. When
the statute is applied, the witness can testify without fear of fur-
ther prosecution, even in such proceedings as would deny the right
to practice a profession such as architecture.40 The basis of this
theory is that the immunity is co-extensive with the privilege. Re-
fusal to answer in disbarment proceedings based on unprofession-
al conduct has been sustained.
41
The argument that there is a distinction between an attorney as
such and an attorney as an individual appears fallacious. The sole
difference lies in the fact that the attorney has taken an oath
to support the Constitution. However, individuals as well as at-
torneys are bound to abide by its provisions. It has been stated
that:
To say that one has an absolute right to a privilege, but if he
exercise it he will be punished, is to limit his enjoyment of that
right, and ... we are unable to see wherein it can be said that an
individual, be he judge, lawyer or layman, is either legally or
morally guilty of a wrong should he claim the right.4 2
In order that the traditional liberty of all citizens may be guar-
anteed, it is reasoned, the lawyer must be able to employ his con-
stitutional privileges. The very vitality of the bar depends upon it.
Conclusion
Every patriotic, deep-thinking lawyer in the United States today
is anxiously concerned about the maintenance of our American
heritage. Upon it the future history of our nation must depend. No
more certain fact can be asserted. The common enemy is Com-
munism and its conspiracy to destroy our constitutional freedoms.
Its followers are wise, and cannot be underestimated. Prevention
of their goal is our goal. The question remains: how may the in-
tegrity of the bar be preserved and the over-all goal accomplished
without the sacrifice of constitutional rights?
Firm adherence to the principles of the Constitution should as-
sure the desired goal. Only by constant application, without allow-
ing the Bill of Rights to become the "watered stock" of our nation,
can we hope to stem the determined bid of subversive influences
from destroying our governmental system.
Exercise of the privilege of self-incrimination by an attorney will
40 Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952).
41 In re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940). The court said the
invoking of the privilege was not ground for disbarment unless it was
accompanied by "contumacious conduct" on the part of the attorney.
42 In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E2d 543, 548 (1941).
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continue to be clouded with uncertainty until action is taken by
the several states. Regulatory legislation seems objectionable for
two reasons: first, the possibility of unconstitutionality; and sec-
ond, the difficulty of drafting such legislation because of the ab-
stractness of the qualities of "character and fitness." The alterna-
tive must be more definitive regulation by the highest courts of
the several states. Since the courts have the power to discipline an
attorney and are responsible for his admission initially, it would
seem that the above objections would be overcome through this
method and a badly-needed definiteness of the law in this area
achieved.
Paul M. Kraus
